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ARE CHRISTIANS OBLIGED TO BE PACIFISTS? 
Evan Fales 
This note contributes to an exchange between J. Kellenberger and S. 
Bringsjord over whether a religiously based ethics is committed to pacifism. 
I argue that Bringsjord's objection to Kellenberger's defense of pacifism is 
misplaced. I then briefly examine the scriptural basis for Christian pacifism. 
In a note replying to J. Kellenberger's "A Defense of Pacifism,"l Selmer 
Bringsjord presents what he regards as a powerful argument against (P), the 
claim that 
(P) For every agent S, if S wages war, then S does something which is 
morally impermissible.2 
Bringsjord takes (P) to articulate a minimal commitment of the pacifist position. 
His argument against (P) is, briefly, that God, who is morally impeccable, is 
(according to the Bible) engaged in a massive war against Satan and his evil 
forces. 
This argument is less powerful than Bringsjord thinks. The natural reply to 
it is that pacifists are committed, not to (P) but to (P'): 
(P') For every human agent S, if S wages war, then S does something which 
is morally impermissible. 
Bringsjord dismisses (P') as being ad hoc. Yet (P') is very far from being ad 
hoc. A pacifist might prefer (P') to (P) for at least two reasons: (1) because 
God has the moral authority to perform acts which humans and nations have 
no authority to perform; and (2) because that authority, in this instance, can 
be grounded in God's greater knowledge. 
(1) There are many acts which ought to be done, but ought not to be done 
by me, because I lack the proper authority. It would be improper for me to 
imprison in my basement for a certain period of time someone whom I know 
to have committed a crime-even if a similar incarceration would quite prop-
erly be imposed by the state. It is improper for me to do this because I lack 
the proper authority: I am neither a judge nor a jailor. Similarly, God has the 
authority to perform certain acts which neither I nor any other human or 
human institution has the authority to perform-e.g., to determine who goes 
to hell. But why suppose that God, and only God, could have the proper moral 
authority to wage war? 
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(2) The natural answer to this second question is that only God knows 
enough about the consequences of waging particular wars; only God is mor-
ally impeccable enough, impartial enough, and so free of self-deception as 
to be sure of waging war for the right reasons; and only God has the means 
to see to it that a war achieves its intended ends and no others. Kellenberger 
holds that war necessarily involves violence, where violence, by his defini-
tion, violates the basic right of persons to be respected as persons. But it is 
not clear that a war waged by God, using divine means, necessarily involves 
violence in this sense. And, even if it does, pacifists who advocate a utilitarian 
or a retributivist theory of justice can maintain that violence is sometimes justi-
fied, even if mere human beings are never in a position to know when. Such a 
pacifist could hold that every human war is at least presumptively wrong. 
Bringsjord's argument against (2) is curious. He imagines an alien being, 
S*, who correctly believes that waging war against human agent S will end 
S's evil activity. And he thinks that no pacifist would condone S*'s waging 
such a war. Similarly, we are to suppose, no pacifist could condone God's 
waging such a war. But why would a pacifist agree to that? Why should he 
suppose that S* here is relevantly analogous to God? S* merely has a true belief 
that his war will terminate S's evil; God would have knowledge. S* considers 
(it seems) merely the consequence that S's evils be brought to an end but not the 
all-things-considered goodness and evil engendered by his act of war; God does 
consider these. S* has (presumably) limited means; God does not. Finally, God 
is morally impeccable, whereas S* mayor may not be. Clearly, our judgment 
about S* is not germane to whether it is ever right for God to wage war. 
So much for the theoretical defense of religious pacifism against the scrip-
tural objection mounted by Bringsjord. But can we find any Biblical backing 
for the two responses just presented? Indeed we can. It is, to be sure, uncertain 
whether the Bible contains any passage unambiguously affirming God's om-
niscience, strictly speaking. But it will be denied by no one that the Bible 
affirms God's knowledge of the world-and of "the hearts of men"-to be 
vastly superior to that of any human being (e.g., Is. 48:3, 5; In. 2:24-25; Acts 
15:18; and, perhaps more tellingly, lob 36:4 and Ps. 147:5). 
So God is, Biblically speaking, in a far better position than we to know 
whether the effects of a war will morally justify the means used to wage it. 
And, it must be conceded, men never are in a very good position to know 
this. Thus it would be quite proper for God to have authority to wage war, 
while improper for men to have this authority (unless demonstrably so com-
manded by God). Furthermore, the N.T. quite explicitly asserts this difference 
in authority. The clearest text is Rom. 12:17-21, which partly reads: 
Repay no one evil for evil... 
Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave 
it to the wrath of God; for it is written, 
"Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says 
300 
the Lord." [Here Paul is quoting 01. 32:35, 
which perhaps has in Ot. a slightly different 
sense than that intended by Paul.] No, 
"if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he 
is thirsty, give him drink .... " Do not be 
overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good. 
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This Pauline passage, moreover, resonates with the Sermon on the Mount, 
most specifically with: 
"But I say to you, Do not resist one 
who is evil. But if anyone strikes 
you on the right cheek, turn to him 
the other also .... " [Mt. 5:39]3 
which is an essential proof-text for Christian pacifists. This difference in 
authority is indeed illustrated by Jesus' whipping of the Temple money chang-
ers, an act from which Mt. 5:39 would require ordinary mortals to refrain. 
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude from this that universal pacifism has 
good Biblical warrant. For one thing, the motive which underlies Paul's pro-
scriptions in Rom. 12 does not seem to reflect what we would understand by 
an ethics of love. He quotes Provo 25:21-23, which has it that by requiting an 
enemy's evil with good, one will "heap coals of fire on his head." Further-
more, we cannot ignore passages like Mt. 10:34-39, which, on the face of it, 
is a commandment to be at war with the members of one's own family. Nor 
is this passage a throw-away line, since nearly a dozen N.T. passages (notably 
Mt. 12:46f and Lk. 14:25-26) repeat the message, a message that appears to 
constitute one of the recurring themes of the Gospels.4 
Do these preachings attributed to Jesus contradict the Sermon on the 
Mount? In fact, they do not. Bluntly put, Jesus' teaching is: love your ene-
mies, hate your kith and kin. The anti-family side of this teaching has seemed 
unpalatable to many, and various interpretive maneuvers have been deployed 
to soften its harshness. It is not my intention here to enter into such interpre-
tive disputes; I will say only that I believe that, given the historical context 
of his ministry, Jesus had eminently good reasons of a pragmatic sort for 
promulgating this astringent doctrine. Even so, in those days of Roman oc-
cupation, it was indeed a hard saying. But not a contradictory one. 
For present purposes, the relevant point is just this. Nothing I have said 
precludes the possibility of giving a religiously based defense of universal 
pacifism. But, on the other hand, no such defense can be based, in a straight-
forward and unproblematic way, upon appeals to Christian scripture. Relig-
ious pacifists are better advised to look elsewhere. 
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NOTES 
1. James Kellenberger, "A Defense of Pacifism," Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987). 
2. Selmer Bringsjord, "Christianity and Pacifism: A Reply to Kellenberger," Faith and 
Philosophy 6 (1989). 
3. Kellenberger, I assume, would find congenial neither the commandment not to resist 
evil, nor the retributivist tone of the Pauline passage. But the language of these texts 
appears to be quite unambiguous. 
4. Elsewhere-e.g., Mt. 5:22 and 7:3-5-Jesus is reported as having preached a more 
conciliatory attitude towards one's brothers. Arguably, however, the use of the kin-term 
in these passages is metaphorical---<:p. Mt. 12:50, and, indeed, the majority of uses of 
d&A.q>Oc; in the N. T. 
